The signing of the mutual defense pact between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in Mecca is one of the most important security developments in the region in recent years. According to this pact, an armed attack on any of the three countries is considered an attack on all members; a clause that is similar to NATO’s Article 5 in terms of collective defense. However, comparing this pact to NATO can be misleading. NATO is the result of decades of building command structures, joint exercises, intelligence and military coordination, and operational mechanisms; while the Mecca pact is still at the beginning of the journey.
Publish dateSunday 9 August 2026 - 13:55
Story Code : 362784
The main question is whether the three countries can transform this agreement from a political and deterrent commitment into a real defense mechanism, or will conflicting interests, economic constraints, and external dependencies prevent it?
One pact; three different calculations
Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia did not enter into this agreement with exactly the same motives.
Pakistan has historical and security ties with Saudi Arabia, military power, and geopolitical position; but at the same time, it faces economic challenges, tension with India, insecurity on the Afghan border, and strategic dependence on China. Therefore, entering a large-scale conflict outside its borders could have a heavy cost for Islamabad.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a member of NATO and has one of the most important armies in the region and has developed its defense industries in recent years. For Ankara, this pact can be a tool for increasing regional influence and diversifying strategic options rather than replacing NATO.
Saudi Arabia, with its financial resources and important geopolitical position, is also seeking to increase deterrence and reduce complete dependence on a foreign power. The experience of the Yemen war and the vulnerability of vital infrastructure to missile and drone attacks have made this issue even more important for Riyadh.
Therefore, the strength of the pact lies in the complementarity of the capacities of the three countries; but this difference in interests could become its weakness in times of crisis.
“Islamic NATO”; Reality or Media Label?
The term “Islamic NATO” was coined because the three-country agreement has a collective defense mechanism. However, the similarity of a clause to NATO’s Article 5 does not mean the formation of an organization at the same level as NATO.
To become a real military alliance, the Mecca Pact requires a command structure, a specific budget, joint exercises, information exchange, a decision-making mechanism, and operational planning.
From this perspective, it is better to consider the new agreement as the initial core of a regional security cooperation; a cooperation that has the potential to expand, but is still a long way from becoming a full-fledged military alliance.
Pakistan; Military Power with Economic Limitations
Pakistan is considered an important capacity for the alliance in terms of military force, combat experience, and deterrence; but its military power is accompanied by economic limitations.
Islamabad continues to grapple with economic problems and the IMF’s reform programs, while simultaneously managing threats from India, Afghanistan, and internal security issues.
Pakistan can therefore play an important role in areas such as training, intelligence sharing, defense cooperation, and deterrence, but entering a trans-regional war directly would be a costly decision for it.
Turkey; Between NATO and Strategic Independence
Turkey is the most complex member of the alliance. On the one hand, it is a NATO member and has extensive defense ties with the United States and Europe, and on the other hand, in recent years, it has tried to expand its relations with Russia, Arab countries, and Asian countries.
From this perspective, the Mecca Pact could be part of Ankara’s “balancing” policy; that is, increasing strategic options without abandoning NATO membership.
Therefore, Turkey’s presence does not necessarily mean the formation of an anti-Western or anti-American coalition.
Saudi Arabia; Capital and Experience of the Yemeni War
Saudi Arabia probably has the greatest incentive to strengthen regional defense mechanisms. Riyadh has spent a lot of money in recent years to strengthen its army and defense systems, but the Yemeni experience has shown that weapons superiority alone cannot eliminate asymmetric threats.
Missiles and drones, especially when they target energy infrastructure, can impose high costs on an economic power.
In such a situation, the Mecca Pact could have a deterrent message for Saudi Arabia: any attack against this country may also trigger a political and military response from the other two powers.
The Nuclear Conundrum; Pakistan’s Shadow Over the Pact
One of the most important and least discussed aspects of the Mecca Pact is Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. Pakistan is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, and any defense cooperation with it, even indirectly, would change the deterrence equation in the Middle East.
If Saudi Arabia or Turkey, in the midst of a war with Iran or Israel, were to ask Pakistan for a “nuclear umbrella,” Islamabad would be caught between US pressure (which wants nonproliferation) and the treaty’s obligations.
A critical scenario is that if Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear facilities, Pakistan might move its options closer to Saudi Arabia for deterrence, a move that would trigger a red line for Tel Aviv and Washington. This layer elevates the treaty from a conventional partnership to a geopolitical challenge of global dimensions.
China’s role is crucial: Beijing is the biggest beneficiary of stability in the region, investing $60 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and buying 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil. The Mecca pact gives China assurances that the three countries will not jeopardize the security of the energy corridors without Beijing’s coordination.
Russia’s role, however, is twofold: Moscow, embroiled in the war with the West in Ukraine, welcomes any agreement that reduces American influence in the region. However, Russia does not want the pact to turn into an anti-Iranian coalition (since Iran is Moscow’s strategic ally). Russia will therefore have a dual position: political support for regional independence, but opposition to any military action against Tehran.
The challenge of the “common enemy”; Lack of a Coordinated Threat In NATO, the “common enemy” (the former Soviet Union and then Russia) was the unifying factor. But in the Mecca Pact, each country has a different primary threat:
Saudi Arabia’s primary threat: Iran (via Yemen and missile attacks)
Turkey’s primary threat: the Kurds of Syria and Iraq (who are supported by the US) as well as Greece (a NATO member)
Pakistan’s primary threat: India (which has close ties with Israel) and Afghanistan
The only possible common threat is “terrorism” or “regional instability,” which is very vaguely defined. The lack of a single, focused threat is the biggest obstacle to the operationalization of the common defense clause, as each country will have its own interpretation of “attack,” and in a real crisis, coordination may reach a deadlock.
Israel’s Role; Covert Influence in Turkey and Pakistan
Contrary to popular belief, Israel has covert intelligence and security ties with both Turkey and Pakistan. Despite Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric, Turkey and Israel continue to cooperate in security and trade (especially in the fields of energy and technology), and in 2022, a gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey was considered. Pakistan, although it does not recognize Israel, has revealed that in the 1990s, Israel provided technical assistance to the Pakistani Air Force (in the field of F-16 aircraft).
So, instead of openly opposing the agreement, Israel will try to use its bilateral relations with Turkey and Pakistan to neutralize any anti-Israel clause in the agreement. Therefore, the Mecca Agreement should not be seen as a purely anti-Zionist alliance.
Iran: A Variable That Cannot Be Ignored
Interpreting the Mecca Agreement as a direct alliance against Iran, at least in the current circumstances, is a simplification. Turkish officials have also emphasized that the agreement is not designed against a specific country.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a path of reducing tensions and normalizing relations with Iran since 2023. This does not mean that the competition between Tehran and Riyadh has ended, but rather shows that Saudi Arabia is pursuing two paths at the same time: diplomacy to reduce tensions and increasing deterrence capacity for crisis situations.
Therefore, the more important question is whether, if a crisis arises between Iran and one of the members of the pact in the future, will the other two members enter into conflict or try to contain the crisis? The answer to this question will determine the true extent of the pact’s cohesion.
The axis of resistance and the test of asymmetric warfare
One of the most important security challenges in the region is the asymmetric threats from actors such as Ansarullah and Hezbollah. Missiles, drones, and sporadic attacks on critical infrastructure are different from classic warfare.
For this reason, even a powerful military coalition does not only need ground and air forces to counter such threats; it must also have early warning systems, air defense, joint intelligence, and operational coordination.
In this regard, the Mecca Pact could increase the capacity of its members if joint mechanisms are established; but it is not yet clear to what extent this cooperation will be operational.
The axis of resistance benefits from a strategy of asymmetric warfare and geographical dispersion that classic defense pacts are powerless against. The 8-year experience of the Saudi war in Yemen showed that even a coalition of 10 Arab countries could not defeat Ansar Allah; therefore, the addition of Pakistan and Turkey (which do not share a border with Yemen) will not significantly change the equation unless intelligence and defense cooperation reaches an operational level.
Succession and legitimacy crisis in the three countries (domestic political layer)
Major military alliances are usually formed in the context of domestic stability, but all three countries are struggling with legitimacy challenges:
Saudi Arabia: Despite reforms, Mohammed bin Salman continues to face a legitimacy crisis among the younger generation and conservatives.
Turkey: Erdogan has not consolidated his power after the 2024 elections and is struggling with a wave of immigration and high inflation.
Pakistan: The military and the civilian government are in constant conflict, and the current prime minister is threatened with a vote of no confidence.
Therefore, politicians in these countries use the treaty as a tool to divert public opinion from domestic problems. For this reason, in times of real crisis, their priority will be “domestic political survival”, not defending a foreign ally. This issue is one of the most important obstacles to turning the treaty into an operational mechanism.
Defense pacts in the Middle East are doomed to failure if imposed from above by foreign powers or if they lack operational infrastructure. The Mecca Pact will also suffer a similar fate if it does not become an organization with a joint budget and headquarters. Although the fundamental difference is that the Mecca Pact was designed by the regional countries themselves, not by extra-regional powers, this difference alone is not enough to guarantee success.
America: Loser or Unwanted Partner?
The Mecca Pact cannot be considered a purely anti-American project. On the one hand, increasing the security independence of the countries of the region could reduce Washington’s direct influence. On the other hand, if the countries of the region assume part of their security responsibility, this process could also be consistent with the US policy of “security burden sharing”.
Therefore, this pact does not necessarily mean America’s withdrawal from the region; It may even force Washington to redefine its security presence and relations with regional allies.
The three countries’ dependence on the United States for weapons (70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s, 65 percent of Turkey’s, and 80 percent of Pakistan’s weapons are made in the United States or NATO) remains a powerful lever in Washington’s hands. In the event of any action against the United States, there is the possibility of disabling the defense systems (similar to what happened in the Turkish attack on Syria in 2019). This dependence severely limits the operational independence of the pact.
Five scenarios ahead of the pact
The future of the Mecca pact can be imagined in several ways:
The first scenario is that the agreement remains at the political and deterrent level, and military cooperation will be limited.
The second scenario is that the three countries move towards a joint command, military exercises, intelligence and defense cooperation, and the pact becomes a real defense mechanism.
The third scenario is that other countries such as Egypt, Jordan or Indonesia join it and the regional weight of the pact increases.
The fourth scenario is the US’s attempt to maintain security relations with the members and guide this cooperation within the framework of the existing order; in such a way that the pact becomes a tool to secure Washington’s interests.
The fifth scenario is the first serious crisis among the members (such as a missile attack on Saudi Arabia or Turkey’s conflict with Greece) that reveals the existing gaps and it becomes clear to what extent “attack one, attack all” is applicable in practice.
The most likely scenario is a combination of the first and fourth scenarios; that is, the pact remains at the political and deterrent level, but the US tries to direct it towards its own interests.
Conclusion; Neither an Islamic NATO, nor a ceremonial agreement
The defense pact of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey cannot be called an “Islamic NATO” in the current circumstances because it still lacks a significant part of NATO’s military and operational structures. But reducing it to a formal agreement would also be a mistake.
The real importance of this pact lies in the process behind it: regional powers are seeking to reduce their security dependence on a foreign power and increase their own options.
Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia each have different capabilities, and if they can put these capabilities into a common mechanism, the Mecca Pact could gradually become one of the pillars of the new security architecture of the region.
But the difference in interests, differences in the definition of the threat, economic restrictions, Turkey’s membership in NATO, Pakistan’s nuclear dilemma, arms dependence on the United States, and Saudi and Pakistani caution in entering into wars of attrition are serious obstacles in its path.
Therefore, the fate of the Mecca Pact will not be determined at the signing ceremony, but in the first real crisis.
Final question
If Ansar Allah were to target Riyadh with missiles manufactured by Iran tomorrow, would the Turkish army cross the Syrian borders and send troops to Yemen? The answer is no; But the question is: isn’t this “predicted negative response” predictable for the regional actors (Iran, Israel, and the United States) and doesn’t this predictability make the pact a tool for containing tension, not escalating war?
The main question is not whether this pact can today’s American security order be sidelined; rather, it is whether the three countries can transform their political commitment into a common, enforceable power in the field?
If the answer is yes, the Mecca Pact could be a sign of the region’s transition from security dependent on a foreign power to a multi-layered, multi-partner security architecture; and if the answer is no, this agreement will ultimately remain more of a deterrent and political message; just like the Baghdad Pact, which was recorded in history books, not on the battlefield.
One pact; three different calculations
Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia did not enter into this agreement with exactly the same motives.
Pakistan has historical and security ties with Saudi Arabia, military power, and geopolitical position; but at the same time, it faces economic challenges, tension with India, insecurity on the Afghan border, and strategic dependence on China. Therefore, entering a large-scale conflict outside its borders could have a heavy cost for Islamabad.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a member of NATO and has one of the most important armies in the region and has developed its defense industries in recent years. For Ankara, this pact can be a tool for increasing regional influence and diversifying strategic options rather than replacing NATO.
Saudi Arabia, with its financial resources and important geopolitical position, is also seeking to increase deterrence and reduce complete dependence on a foreign power. The experience of the Yemen war and the vulnerability of vital infrastructure to missile and drone attacks have made this issue even more important for Riyadh.
Therefore, the strength of the pact lies in the complementarity of the capacities of the three countries; but this difference in interests could become its weakness in times of crisis.
“Islamic NATO”; Reality or Media Label?
The term “Islamic NATO” was coined because the three-country agreement has a collective defense mechanism. However, the similarity of a clause to NATO’s Article 5 does not mean the formation of an organization at the same level as NATO.
To become a real military alliance, the Mecca Pact requires a command structure, a specific budget, joint exercises, information exchange, a decision-making mechanism, and operational planning.
From this perspective, it is better to consider the new agreement as the initial core of a regional security cooperation; a cooperation that has the potential to expand, but is still a long way from becoming a full-fledged military alliance.
Pakistan; Military Power with Economic Limitations
Pakistan is considered an important capacity for the alliance in terms of military force, combat experience, and deterrence; but its military power is accompanied by economic limitations.
Islamabad continues to grapple with economic problems and the IMF’s reform programs, while simultaneously managing threats from India, Afghanistan, and internal security issues.
Pakistan can therefore play an important role in areas such as training, intelligence sharing, defense cooperation, and deterrence, but entering a trans-regional war directly would be a costly decision for it.
Turkey; Between NATO and Strategic Independence
Turkey is the most complex member of the alliance. On the one hand, it is a NATO member and has extensive defense ties with the United States and Europe, and on the other hand, in recent years, it has tried to expand its relations with Russia, Arab countries, and Asian countries.
From this perspective, the Mecca Pact could be part of Ankara’s “balancing” policy; that is, increasing strategic options without abandoning NATO membership.
Therefore, Turkey’s presence does not necessarily mean the formation of an anti-Western or anti-American coalition.
Saudi Arabia; Capital and Experience of the Yemeni War
Saudi Arabia probably has the greatest incentive to strengthen regional defense mechanisms. Riyadh has spent a lot of money in recent years to strengthen its army and defense systems, but the Yemeni experience has shown that weapons superiority alone cannot eliminate asymmetric threats.
Missiles and drones, especially when they target energy infrastructure, can impose high costs on an economic power.
In such a situation, the Mecca Pact could have a deterrent message for Saudi Arabia: any attack against this country may also trigger a political and military response from the other two powers.
The Nuclear Conundrum; Pakistan’s Shadow Over the Pact
One of the most important and least discussed aspects of the Mecca Pact is Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. Pakistan is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, and any defense cooperation with it, even indirectly, would change the deterrence equation in the Middle East.
If Saudi Arabia or Turkey, in the midst of a war with Iran or Israel, were to ask Pakistan for a “nuclear umbrella,” Islamabad would be caught between US pressure (which wants nonproliferation) and the treaty’s obligations.
A critical scenario is that if Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear facilities, Pakistan might move its options closer to Saudi Arabia for deterrence, a move that would trigger a red line for Tel Aviv and Washington. This layer elevates the treaty from a conventional partnership to a geopolitical challenge of global dimensions.
China’s role is crucial: Beijing is the biggest beneficiary of stability in the region, investing $60 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and buying 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil. The Mecca pact gives China assurances that the three countries will not jeopardize the security of the energy corridors without Beijing’s coordination.
Russia’s role, however, is twofold: Moscow, embroiled in the war with the West in Ukraine, welcomes any agreement that reduces American influence in the region. However, Russia does not want the pact to turn into an anti-Iranian coalition (since Iran is Moscow’s strategic ally). Russia will therefore have a dual position: political support for regional independence, but opposition to any military action against Tehran.
The challenge of the “common enemy”; Lack of a Coordinated Threat In NATO, the “common enemy” (the former Soviet Union and then Russia) was the unifying factor. But in the Mecca Pact, each country has a different primary threat:
Saudi Arabia’s primary threat: Iran (via Yemen and missile attacks)
Turkey’s primary threat: the Kurds of Syria and Iraq (who are supported by the US) as well as Greece (a NATO member)
Pakistan’s primary threat: India (which has close ties with Israel) and Afghanistan
The only possible common threat is “terrorism” or “regional instability,” which is very vaguely defined. The lack of a single, focused threat is the biggest obstacle to the operationalization of the common defense clause, as each country will have its own interpretation of “attack,” and in a real crisis, coordination may reach a deadlock.
Israel’s Role; Covert Influence in Turkey and Pakistan
Contrary to popular belief, Israel has covert intelligence and security ties with both Turkey and Pakistan. Despite Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric, Turkey and Israel continue to cooperate in security and trade (especially in the fields of energy and technology), and in 2022, a gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey was considered. Pakistan, although it does not recognize Israel, has revealed that in the 1990s, Israel provided technical assistance to the Pakistani Air Force (in the field of F-16 aircraft).
So, instead of openly opposing the agreement, Israel will try to use its bilateral relations with Turkey and Pakistan to neutralize any anti-Israel clause in the agreement. Therefore, the Mecca Agreement should not be seen as a purely anti-Zionist alliance.
Iran: A Variable That Cannot Be Ignored
Interpreting the Mecca Agreement as a direct alliance against Iran, at least in the current circumstances, is a simplification. Turkish officials have also emphasized that the agreement is not designed against a specific country.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a path of reducing tensions and normalizing relations with Iran since 2023. This does not mean that the competition between Tehran and Riyadh has ended, but rather shows that Saudi Arabia is pursuing two paths at the same time: diplomacy to reduce tensions and increasing deterrence capacity for crisis situations.
Therefore, the more important question is whether, if a crisis arises between Iran and one of the members of the pact in the future, will the other two members enter into conflict or try to contain the crisis? The answer to this question will determine the true extent of the pact’s cohesion.
The axis of resistance and the test of asymmetric warfare
One of the most important security challenges in the region is the asymmetric threats from actors such as Ansarullah and Hezbollah. Missiles, drones, and sporadic attacks on critical infrastructure are different from classic warfare.
For this reason, even a powerful military coalition does not only need ground and air forces to counter such threats; it must also have early warning systems, air defense, joint intelligence, and operational coordination.
In this regard, the Mecca Pact could increase the capacity of its members if joint mechanisms are established; but it is not yet clear to what extent this cooperation will be operational.
The axis of resistance benefits from a strategy of asymmetric warfare and geographical dispersion that classic defense pacts are powerless against. The 8-year experience of the Saudi war in Yemen showed that even a coalition of 10 Arab countries could not defeat Ansar Allah; therefore, the addition of Pakistan and Turkey (which do not share a border with Yemen) will not significantly change the equation unless intelligence and defense cooperation reaches an operational level.
Succession and legitimacy crisis in the three countries (domestic political layer)
Major military alliances are usually formed in the context of domestic stability, but all three countries are struggling with legitimacy challenges:
Saudi Arabia: Despite reforms, Mohammed bin Salman continues to face a legitimacy crisis among the younger generation and conservatives.
Turkey: Erdogan has not consolidated his power after the 2024 elections and is struggling with a wave of immigration and high inflation.
Pakistan: The military and the civilian government are in constant conflict, and the current prime minister is threatened with a vote of no confidence.
Therefore, politicians in these countries use the treaty as a tool to divert public opinion from domestic problems. For this reason, in times of real crisis, their priority will be “domestic political survival”, not defending a foreign ally. This issue is one of the most important obstacles to turning the treaty into an operational mechanism.
Defense pacts in the Middle East are doomed to failure if imposed from above by foreign powers or if they lack operational infrastructure. The Mecca Pact will also suffer a similar fate if it does not become an organization with a joint budget and headquarters. Although the fundamental difference is that the Mecca Pact was designed by the regional countries themselves, not by extra-regional powers, this difference alone is not enough to guarantee success.
America: Loser or Unwanted Partner?
The Mecca Pact cannot be considered a purely anti-American project. On the one hand, increasing the security independence of the countries of the region could reduce Washington’s direct influence. On the other hand, if the countries of the region assume part of their security responsibility, this process could also be consistent with the US policy of “security burden sharing”.
Therefore, this pact does not necessarily mean America’s withdrawal from the region; It may even force Washington to redefine its security presence and relations with regional allies.
The three countries’ dependence on the United States for weapons (70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s, 65 percent of Turkey’s, and 80 percent of Pakistan’s weapons are made in the United States or NATO) remains a powerful lever in Washington’s hands. In the event of any action against the United States, there is the possibility of disabling the defense systems (similar to what happened in the Turkish attack on Syria in 2019). This dependence severely limits the operational independence of the pact.
Five scenarios ahead of the pact
The future of the Mecca pact can be imagined in several ways:
The first scenario is that the agreement remains at the political and deterrent level, and military cooperation will be limited.
The second scenario is that the three countries move towards a joint command, military exercises, intelligence and defense cooperation, and the pact becomes a real defense mechanism.
The third scenario is that other countries such as Egypt, Jordan or Indonesia join it and the regional weight of the pact increases.
The fourth scenario is the US’s attempt to maintain security relations with the members and guide this cooperation within the framework of the existing order; in such a way that the pact becomes a tool to secure Washington’s interests.
The fifth scenario is the first serious crisis among the members (such as a missile attack on Saudi Arabia or Turkey’s conflict with Greece) that reveals the existing gaps and it becomes clear to what extent “attack one, attack all” is applicable in practice.
The most likely scenario is a combination of the first and fourth scenarios; that is, the pact remains at the political and deterrent level, but the US tries to direct it towards its own interests.
Conclusion; Neither an Islamic NATO, nor a ceremonial agreement
The defense pact of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey cannot be called an “Islamic NATO” in the current circumstances because it still lacks a significant part of NATO’s military and operational structures. But reducing it to a formal agreement would also be a mistake.
The real importance of this pact lies in the process behind it: regional powers are seeking to reduce their security dependence on a foreign power and increase their own options.
Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia each have different capabilities, and if they can put these capabilities into a common mechanism, the Mecca Pact could gradually become one of the pillars of the new security architecture of the region.
But the difference in interests, differences in the definition of the threat, economic restrictions, Turkey’s membership in NATO, Pakistan’s nuclear dilemma, arms dependence on the United States, and Saudi and Pakistani caution in entering into wars of attrition are serious obstacles in its path.
Therefore, the fate of the Mecca Pact will not be determined at the signing ceremony, but in the first real crisis.
Final question
If Ansar Allah were to target Riyadh with missiles manufactured by Iran tomorrow, would the Turkish army cross the Syrian borders and send troops to Yemen? The answer is no; But the question is: isn’t this “predicted negative response” predictable for the regional actors (Iran, Israel, and the United States) and doesn’t this predictability make the pact a tool for containing tension, not escalating war?
The main question is not whether this pact can today’s American security order be sidelined; rather, it is whether the three countries can transform their political commitment into a common, enforceable power in the field?
If the answer is yes, the Mecca Pact could be a sign of the region’s transition from security dependent on a foreign power to a multi-layered, multi-partner security architecture; and if the answer is no, this agreement will ultimately remain more of a deterrent and political message; just like the Baghdad Pact, which was recorded in history books, not on the battlefield.
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