Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore have taken serious steps to enter the nuclear energy era and are expected to launch their first operational reactors by the early 2030s. In this technological competition, China has not only positioned itself alongside traditional exporters such as France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, but has also become an attractive and worrying option for countries in the region by offering comprehensive and complete packages.
Publish dateMonday 18 May 2026 - 09:21
Story Code : 355039
Afghan Voice Agency (AVA): Relying on its huge domestic industrial capacity, Beijing is now offering packages to global markets that include engineering, procurement, manufacturing, training, and fuel supply, according to a report by the South China Morning Post. With 61 reactors in operation and 36 under construction, China has the world’s third-largest nuclear reactor network, and crucially, about 90 percent of its components are manufactured domestically. This industrial self-sufficiency has given Beijing a power few exporters have: offering a single package that makes the host country completely dependent, from financing to spent fuel disposal.
Targeting 30 reactors by 2030: Economy or influence?
Beijing has set a target of building 30 nuclear reactors by 2030 as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, a project that could potentially generate $147 billion in revenue for China. Projects are under construction or planned in Pakistan, Argentina, Kenya, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia. But what makes the program more than just an economic proposition is its long-term strategic nature.
For Southeast Asian countries, choosing a nuclear technology partner is more than a simple business deal. A reactor has a lifespan of more than 40 years, and these contracts create long-term partnerships and dependencies in terms of capital, technology, expertise, fuel supply and nuclear waste disposal. Simply put, choosing a vendor today secures strategic relationships for decades to come.
Thorium Bait: Peaceful Technology or Long-Term Leash?
One of China’s trump cards in this race is thorium-based reactor technology. Compared to conventional uranium cycles, thorium has less potential for use in nuclear weapons, significantly reduces high-level radioactive waste, and has more advanced safety features. These features ostensibly make it an ideal option for developing countries.
But behind this technical appeal lies a geopolitical reality: dependence on technology and fuel. Conventional reactors rely on low-enriched uranium, and only a handful of countries have the technical capability to enrich uranium on a large scale. Russia remains the world’s main supplier, but China is rapidly expanding its fuel cycle capabilities to support its growing reactor exports. This means that host countries will remain dependent on Beijing for fuel, maintenance, upgrades, and technical support for decades to come.
Infrastructure Dependency, Influence Rewards
Maintenance, upgrades, and technical support typically remain dependent on the primary vendor, shaping regulatory standards and institutional capacity over decades. Over time, this can create long-term dependency on both the host country’s technical systems and governance frameworks. In other words, China is exporting not just a power plant, but an “influence infrastructure.”
Strategic Concerns in the Shadow of the Nuclear Renaissance
The so-called “nuclear renaissance” in Southeast Asia, driven by valid motives such as energy insecurity, climate commitments, and the growing need for sustainable electricity for data centers and artificial intelligence, has now become an arena for great power competition. The key question is: Are Southeast Asian countries simply seeking clean energy, or are they embarking on a path that will lead to long-term strategic dependence on Beijing?
China has been engaging with regional countries on nuclear development for decades through forums such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and the Nuclear Cooperation Forum in Asia. These engagements are now bearing fruit, but the fruits may be more than just electricity; they could change the balance of power in Asia for generations.
Targeting 30 reactors by 2030: Economy or influence?
Beijing has set a target of building 30 nuclear reactors by 2030 as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, a project that could potentially generate $147 billion in revenue for China. Projects are under construction or planned in Pakistan, Argentina, Kenya, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia. But what makes the program more than just an economic proposition is its long-term strategic nature.
For Southeast Asian countries, choosing a nuclear technology partner is more than a simple business deal. A reactor has a lifespan of more than 40 years, and these contracts create long-term partnerships and dependencies in terms of capital, technology, expertise, fuel supply and nuclear waste disposal. Simply put, choosing a vendor today secures strategic relationships for decades to come.
Thorium Bait: Peaceful Technology or Long-Term Leash?
One of China’s trump cards in this race is thorium-based reactor technology. Compared to conventional uranium cycles, thorium has less potential for use in nuclear weapons, significantly reduces high-level radioactive waste, and has more advanced safety features. These features ostensibly make it an ideal option for developing countries.
But behind this technical appeal lies a geopolitical reality: dependence on technology and fuel. Conventional reactors rely on low-enriched uranium, and only a handful of countries have the technical capability to enrich uranium on a large scale. Russia remains the world’s main supplier, but China is rapidly expanding its fuel cycle capabilities to support its growing reactor exports. This means that host countries will remain dependent on Beijing for fuel, maintenance, upgrades, and technical support for decades to come.
Infrastructure Dependency, Influence Rewards
Maintenance, upgrades, and technical support typically remain dependent on the primary vendor, shaping regulatory standards and institutional capacity over decades. Over time, this can create long-term dependency on both the host country’s technical systems and governance frameworks. In other words, China is exporting not just a power plant, but an “influence infrastructure.”
Strategic Concerns in the Shadow of the Nuclear Renaissance
The so-called “nuclear renaissance” in Southeast Asia, driven by valid motives such as energy insecurity, climate commitments, and the growing need for sustainable electricity for data centers and artificial intelligence, has now become an arena for great power competition. The key question is: Are Southeast Asian countries simply seeking clean energy, or are they embarking on a path that will lead to long-term strategic dependence on Beijing?
China has been engaging with regional countries on nuclear development for decades through forums such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and the Nuclear Cooperation Forum in Asia. These engagements are now bearing fruit, but the fruits may be more than just electricity; they could change the balance of power in Asia for generations.
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