Publish dateTuesday 4 June 2024 - 11:25
Story Code : 291488

Doha 3; Evaluating the relationship between the ّIslamic Emirate and the West

Center for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academic discussion titled "Doha 3: How the Islamic Emirate interacts with the international community"
Doha 3; Evaluating the relationship between the ّIslamic Emirate and the West
Zakir Jalali / The first meeting of the special representatives of several countries for Afghanistan will be held under the leadership of Antonio Guterres, the United Nations Secretary-General in May 2023 in Doha. The second was held on February 18 and 19, and the Islamic Emirate was also invited to participate in it. But the Islamic Emirate did not participate due to non-fulfilment of the conditions.
Now the third session is scheduled to be held on June 30 and July 1. This time, not only the Emirate has been invited, but many western and regional delegations have come to Kabul and are trying to encourage the Emirate to participate in Doha 3. Last month, Ms. Rosemarie Di Carlo, Assistant Secretary General, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, the delegation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Special Representative of the European Union, Thomas Nicholas, encouraged the visiting Kabul and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to participate in Doha 3. It seems that this time the managers and hosts of this seat are looking to provide an opportunity to visit the Islamic Emirate in Doha 3.
The Islamic Emirate has held preliminary talks with the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Qatari authorities regarding Doha 3, and the preliminary agenda will also be shared for discussion. But Kabul, based on the promise, is waiting for the United Nations to share all the final details, the agenda and the meeting so that a decision can be made about the partnership.
Previous negotiations Doha
The Doha series of meetings will actually bring back the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. In March 2023, the Security Council passed Resolution 2679 and mandated the Secretary General to conduct an independent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan.
At the request of the Security Council, on April 25 last year, the Secretary-General appointed Feridun Snerlioglu, a former Turkish politician and diplomat, as the special coordinator for the permanent assessment. Snerlioglu shared his first draft assessment with the member states of the Security Council on November 17. There were many discussions about the evaluation among the member states of the Security Council. Russia and China emphasized that the opinion of the Afghan government should be taken into consideration when evaluating the proposals. Finally, the independent assessment of Snerli Oglu will be approved by the Security Council on December 29, 2023 through Resolution 2721. This arrangement will be approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Evaluation Fereydon Snerlioglu
Snerli Oglu's assessment is made up of four sections, namely: the case, key themes and priorities, recommendations and conclusions. Among these four sections, there are two main sections, for example, the second section highlights important topics and priorities, and the third section contains recommendations that include mechanisms to support the process.
In Afghanistan, humanitarian issues, human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, the rights of religious and national minorities, security and terrorism, drugs, development, economic and social challenges, dialogue, governance and the rule of law have been mentioned.
Regarding recommendations, many international actors support more international interaction. But in a coordinated, coherent and organized way, the results are clear for all parties. In terms of recommendations, the author has drawn a road map in which the Emirate should take specific steps and finally Afghanistan will be recognized as an official country by the international community.
The first recommendation asks the international community to meet the immediate needs of Afghans through confidence building. For example, aid should be more regular and sustainable, especially in the areas of food security, livelihoods and health.
It is also recommended that international aid be expanded if it meets the basic needs of Afghans. Economic negotiations and reforms for economic reconstruction should be started so that various obstacles can be removed. There may be obstacles in the way of regular transit, trade and other means of communication between Afghanistan and the world, and other steps should be taken so that Afghans realize their political, economic, cultural and social rights.
The second recommendation calls for cooperation in the fields of security, logic and politics. For example, supporting bilateral and multilateral security cooperation; Supporting international anti-narcotics investigations; Strengthening international borders, including effective border controls; Development of international cooperation and assistance that supports regional and international priorities.
In the third part of the recommendations, the road map for the reintegration of the Afghan state with the international system is presented, which is a very important part. In this roadmap, first of all, the commitments of the government of Afghanistan are specified. For example, Afghanistan has been asked to accept the charter and all the conventions that Afghanistan has already ratified, and to provide the basis for the creation of an inclusive state through intra-Afghan dialogue. As part of the recommendation, the international community has also been requested to restore normal relations with the Islamic Emirate.

Mechanisms supporting interaction
In the fourth recommendation, Mr. Snerli oglu proposes three mechanisms to support interaction:
A: The United Nations is a senior group-led format that is held at the level of special representatives of many countries for Afghanistan. The meeting in Doha will be held on the basis of this recommendation if the meeting is scheduled for June 30. The Islamic Emirate has no objection to the Doha Forum, but what is important is what is being discussed, who are the participants and how the Emirate's participation is considered. Due to differences of opinion in these cases, the emirate refused to participate in Doha 2.
B: A group of inter-contact, if the group is smaller, the seat will be larger. This group coordinates small actions and strategies among international partners, will continue and intensify the interaction and will continue the interaction with the Afghan government.
Due to the new waves of geopolitical rivalry, mistrust and disagreement between the regional and western countries and the increasing differences between America, Russia and China, the member states could not hold the Troika Plus Afghanistan meeting from 2022. Considering the distance and distrust of these countries, it is unlikely that the United Nations will succeed in establishing an international contact group.
C: The Special Representative of the United Nations will be the Special Representative of the United Nations to facilitate interaction with the international and Afghan parties, the mission will be a special representative, diplomacy between Afghanistan and the international community, as well as intra-Afghan talks.
The Islamic Emirate calls the appointment of a special representative an immediate solution. Some other countries in the region also have questions about the appointment of a special representative in the presence of UNAMA. First, the government of Afghanistan is in contact with many countries through bilateral mechanisms, so it can communicate with Western countries through bilateral mechanisms and find solutions to challenges.
Second, intra-Afghan talks were discussed before August 15, 2021. Because at that time the transfer of power in Afghanistan was a necessity if this order was also fulfilled. Before August 2021, talks between the Emirate partners and the Kabul regime took place. Now that the transfer of power has taken place, the Kabul regime has practically disappeared and the Emirate is practically ruling the entire country. So, if there is an intra-Afghan dialogue, who will it be between? Because on the one hand, if the intra-Afghan negotiations had political power at that time, they no longer exist.
Thirdly, in the presence of UNAMA, the appointment of a special representative is unnecessary. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regular communication with UNAMA, so what activities will the Additional Special Representative perform in the presence of UNAMA?

So far, there is a preliminary agreement to discuss the preliminary agenda of the Doha 3 meeting, including financial and banking issues, the fight against drugs and alternative livelihoods, and if possible, issues related to climate change.
From the initial agenda, it seems that 3 controversial topics will not be discussed in Doha.
The composition of this seat is not yet specified. But looking at the results of the Doha 2 meeting and the current preliminary discussions, it seems that the organizers and hosts of the meeting are looking for this combination not to be controversial. Because if one of the reasons for the non-participation of the Islamic Emirate in the previous meeting was the combination meeting or it was not inclusive.
In addition, the Islamic Emirate may decide whether to participate in Doha 3 if the final details are presented at this meeting and discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate.
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